Stablecoins provide a false sense of security. They give the impression to the uninitiated and\/or uncaring that a particular coin is pegged to the U.S. dollar, or an equivalent of the dollar in terms of value and stability, and that if you want to convert your stablecoin to dollars, you can do so easily and instantaneously. <\/b>Yet, they do no such thing, as <\/span>demonstrated by the recent collapse<\/span><\/a> of Terra and its TerraUSD stablecoin and LUNA token and also made clear in September 2008 by the collapse of the Reserve Primary Fund money market fund during the height of the global financial crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n Powers On\u2026<\/i><\/b> is a monthly opinion column from Marc Powers, who spent much of his 40-year legal career working with complex securities-related cases in the United States after a stint with the SEC. He is now an adjunct professor at Florida International University College of Law, where he teaches a course on \u201cBlockchain & the Law.\u201d<\/span><\/i>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n So, I now unequivocally state what is obvious: <\/span>If you are an owner of or investor in any cryptocurrencies, you need to understand this lack of protection and safeguard the portion of your wealth held in digital assets.<\/span><\/i> You can protect these assets by keeping them in cold digital wallets, on exchanges registered with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, or with another entity regulated by the SEC, CFTC or Treasury. Even entities and exchanges with BitLicenses, such as Coinbase and Gemini, may not provide sufficient protection.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n As I write this column, UST has a value of about $0.07. One month ago, it was one of the top 10 cryptocurrencies by market cap and maintained a steady value of $1. It was perceived as a reliable, \u201csafe\u201d cryptocurrency for trading activities, where transaction risks were eliminated and liquidity was provided to the trading parties, both for trading occurring on centralized exchanges and decentralized platforms. Not anymore.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Although some may disagree, cryptocurrencies are speculative in both value and utility. Their prices are volatile, and they are best understood when considered a nascent alternative economic, capital markets and financial system \u2014 backed by a new technology that is still being developed and tested in innumerable ways. Crypto is tested by criminals wanting to hack vulnerable blockchains for illegal gains, studied by governments seeking to regulate or ban its use, and continually worked on by developers seeking to improve its public-source codes. Hence, it falls within the class of \u201calternative assets.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Those involved with investment management and analysis have been led to believe that stablecoins are a viable solution to avoiding the risks associated with cryptocurrencies \u2014 no differently than the SEC-registered Reserve Primary Fund touted its money market fund, with over $60 billion in assets at its peak, as a safe haven to park money and earn interest. The Reserve Primary Fund, and most of the other money market funds in the early 2000s, promoted themselves as an alternative to keeping cash in bank deposit accounts and a way to earn better interest rates than banks were providing. Its share price was supposed to always maintain a $1 net asset value (the measure by which mutual funds are publicly traded) because it was supposedly backed one-to-one in U.S. bonds, which are guaranteed by the <\/span>full faith and credit<\/span><\/i> of the U.S. Treasury. Yet amid the financial crisis, on Sept. 16, 2008 \u2014 the day after the venerable investment firm Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy \u2014 the Reserve Primary Fund \u201cbroke the buck.\u201d Its NAV fell to as low as $0.97 from its $1 peg.<\/span><\/p>\n Why? Well, for reasons parallel to the UST collapse. As it turns out, a portion of the Reserve Primary Fund was not invested in U.S.-backed bonds and treasuries but instead in commercial paper issued by corporations, not the government. This was done to boost the money market\u2019s return \u2014 to offer a higher competitive interest rate to investors willing to park their money in the fund rather than a traditional bank. However, this approach had two fundamental problems, as Reserve Primary Fund investors would learn. At that point in time, money market funds were neither insured and protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation like bank accounts nor covered for losses by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation like stocks held in brokerage accounts.<\/span><\/p>\n Second, as previously noted, over half the fund\u2019s portfolio was invested in commercial paper rather than U.S.-backed securities. When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, investors became concerned that money market mutual funds held Lehman Brothers\u2019 commercial paper. So, the next day, a run on those funds began. And although the Reserve Primary Fund reportedly held less than 1.5% in Lehman Brothers paper, the NAV fell below $1. Ultimately, the fund was closed and liquidated, but not before the U.S. government stepped in with two forms of legislation: the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program and the Debt Guarantee Program. Both combined protected investor money in mutual funds and guaranteed short-term debt issued by participating banks. (These programs and protections ended in 2012.)<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n With TerraUSD, Terraform Labs created a so-called <\/span>algorithmic stablecoin<\/span><\/a> \u2014 one not backed by assets like cash or U.S. government bonds but instead relying upon trading and treasury management to maintain the value of the NAV at $1. This reportedly included collateralizing UST, in part, with Bitcoin. However, the actual assets backing UST were apparently less than its market capitalization by severalfold. So, when there was a run on UST, the whole thing collapsed.<\/span><\/p>\n Now, other stablecoin issuers, like Circle with USD Coin and Tether with USDT, will say this cannot happen to their coins. The problem was because UST was an undercapitalized, algorithmic stablecoin, while they are backed one-to-one by dollars and U.S. government securities. But that is not entirely true. <\/span>An investigation of Tether<\/span><\/a> by the New York State Office of the Attorney General revealed that a good amount of the collateral was not dollars but loans or commercial paper.<\/span> \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n This is the same sort of collateral that took down the Reserve Primary Fund in 2008 in a run. It is also true that neither Circle\u2019s nor Tether\u2019s stablecoins are protected against investor loss by a government-backed agency like SIPC or FDIC.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n What this all means is that you, and only you, are responsible for protecting your crypto assets and wealth. So, be careful and thoughtful where you choose to hold digital assets and when deciding whether it is wise to hold significant value in stablecoins.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Marc Powers<\/b> is currently an adjunct professor at Florida International University College of Law, where he is teaching \u201cBlockchain & the Law\u201d and \u201cFintech Law.\u201d He recently retired from practicing at an Am Law 100 law firm, where he built both its national securities litigation and regulatory enforcement practice team and its hedge fund industry practice. Marc started his legal career in the SEC\u2019s Enforcement Division. During his 40 years in law, he was involved in representations including the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme, a recent presidential pardon and the Martha Stewart insider trading trial.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n The opinions expressed are the author\u2019s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Cointelegraph nor Florida International University College of Law or its affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal or investment advice.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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<\/p>\nSo, what are some takeaways from the UST\/LUNA \u201cbreak the buck\u201d price collapse?<\/h4>\n
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