\n<\/p>\n
This week the United States Congress\u00a0approved<\/a>\u00a0another $40 billion in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, bringing the total to $54 billion since the outbreak of the war. The West\u2019s focus on the provision of military aid is sensible, yet as others have\u00a0written<\/a>, little thought has been given to the ends to which those weapons are put.\u00a0<\/p>\n Three months into the war, it appears not much consideration has been given to the effects of this war and the impact regional response to the conflict will have in the longer term. Washington and other European capitals must think beyond the immediate military campaign to the broader geopolitical strategic questions and considerations, not the least of which is a militarily and economically hobbled pariah Russian state \u2014 something that is being obscured by the unwarranted triumphalist rhetoric and narrow focus on the theatre aspects of this war.\u00a0<\/p>\n There are, unsurprisingly, far more questions than answers as the war is not yet over and the post-war environment is equally unclear. Nonetheless, there are outlines forming and issues on the horizon with which the West will have to contend. Sadly, one would be forgiven for thinking that that policy and news cycles appear to have moved on. Here, it is not the absence of answers that is alarming, but the fact that the questions are not being asked at all that should concern the public.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s forces have, in some places, pushed Russian forces back to pre-invasion lines of control and borders \u2014 progress that is to be commended. There is a risk that the newly emergent triumphalism will be just as blinding as the (accurate) narratives of Ukrainian heroism in the face of overwhelming odds. This has led to ill-considered rhetorical\u00a0questions<\/a>\u00a0as to whether Ukraine will invade Russia. These questions do nothing more than illustrate the lack of forethought in policymaking and feed into Russia\u2019s information war.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n There is also the risk of mismanaged expectations for Ukrainian success, that Kyiv\u2019s progress will somehow lead to a reversal of 2014 losses and it retaking Crimea and ending the frozen conflict on its eastern border. At the same time, much of the punditry\u2019s discussions about the war\u2019s end have\u00a0omitted<\/a>\u00a0the agency of the Ukrainians themselves, as though an accord will be reached between Washington and Moscow.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Washington and others must also begin thinking through how the war\u2019s end could set the stage for the next conflict. A militarily weakened and economically hobbled Russia will not sit idly by, simply retreating to its corner and refraining from responding. This is not a call for limited aims when it comes to Russia, rather, a recognition that the war\u2019s end will inevitably affect European peace and security in the year after and the five years beyond. Finland and Sweden\u2019s accession to NATO (Turkey\u2019s objections notwithstanding) will unequivocally be a net\u00a0positive<\/a>\u00a0for the alliance, but considering how the enlarged alliance will respond to Russia\u2019s post-Ukraine behavior is critical for its long-term success.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n The full\u00a0effect<\/a>\u00a0of Western sanctions on Russia is also yet to be felt. In the near term, Moscow has\u00a0artificially buoyed the ruble<\/a>\u00a0and, at least superficially (and likely temporarily), adapted to the economic pressure \u2014 due to significant state intervention. Expectations that this should continue to be the case are misguided. The long tail economic impact is unclear. The shortage of precursor goods and finished products will increasingly affect Russia\u2019s industrial base, and whilst autarky is attractive for some within Russia\u2019s politics, it is likely unsustainable for the country.\u00a0<\/p>\n